A seat at the table, but who decides? Social partners in the governance of public employment and social security institutions

In most EU Member States and in Norway, representatives of employers and trade unions participate to some degree in the governance of the institutions that provide employment services and employment-related benefits. A Eurofound project has examined the role of the social partners in the governance of these institutions, based on contributions from the Network of Eurofound Correspondents and the views of trade unions, employer organisations, and PES and SSI management. This article presents some preliminary findings.

The numbers of PES and SSI per country differ across Europe, reflecting the diversity of national welfare structures. The PES of most countries consist of one centralised national body, usually with regional or local offices. Finland is the only country in which there is no central PES body; employment services have been provided entirely by the municipalities at local level following the abolition of the previous national Employment and Economic Development (TE) Offices in January 2025. Belgium and France are also distinct as there are four different PES in each. In the case of Belgium, this is a result of the country’s regional set-up, with one PES each for Flanders (the Flemish Public Employment Service and Vocational Training Agency, VDAB), Wallonia (Forem), Brussels (Actiris) and the German-speaking community (the Employment Office of the German-speaking Community, ADG). In France, four institutions (the state (l’État), Afpa, France Travail and Unédic) cover different core areas of the country’s PES.

Regarding SSI – the bodies responsible for benefits directly linked to employment – the picture is more diverse. Sixteen of the 28 countries have a single SSI, and 9 have two such bodies, dividing responsibility for different benefits (such as unemployment benefits and pensions) in most cases. In Finland and Germany, there are three SSI, one each for separate branches of social security, while France has four (with separate institutions for unemployment insurance, health insurance, family benefits and a sector-specific scheme).

In most countries, the involvement of the social partners in the various governance bodies within the PES and SSI is formally embedded in legislation or the founding regulations. In Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway, their role is informal (i.e. not established in legislation) in both institutions. In Malta, their role is informal in the PES but formal in the SSI; in Sweden, it is the reverse: formal in the PES and informal in the SSI. In some Member States, there is no social partner involvement at all; this is the case in Italy for the PES, while in Hungary and Latvia the social partners have no role in either the PES or SSI.

In terms of the involvement of the social partners in the governance of the PES and SSI and the extent of their role, the diversity across countries widens. Their role can be classified into four main types: active co-manager, supervisory, advisory or none at all.

In the PES of Austria, Belgium, Estonia and Germany, the social partners are co-decision-makers with statutory authority within tripartite bodies over strategic priorities, budgets, resource allocation and organisational staffing. This applies to Austria’s Federal Employment Service (AMS), which is governed by a strictly formalised tripartite administrative board at federal and regional levels. Germany’s Federal Employment Agency (BA) operates as a self-governing public body supervised by a tripartite board of governors with equal representation of employers, employees and public authorities. This board approves the BA’s business policy, strategic direction and budget. In Belgium, the PES governance is regionalised, with the social partners exercising joint executive management on the boards of directors of Flanders’ VDAB, Walloonia’s Forem, Brussels’ Actiris and the German-speaking region’s ADG. The Flemish legislation, for example, requires the presence of at least half of the employer and employee representatives to validate any board decisions.

In another five countries, the social partners have a supervisory role in PES governance. In Spain, for example, the general council of the State Public Employment Service (SEPE) incorporates the social partners in strategic planning, with the trade unions describing their influence as primarily supervisory and informative but lacking direct management functions. Croatia is similar, where the social partners sit on the management board of the Croatian Employment Service (HZZ) and contribute to budget reviews and policy monitoring. In France, the social partners provide strategic monitoring and policy evaluation for three of the four PES (the state, Afpa and France Travail) and are involved as co-managers of Unédic.

The highest number of countries – 15 – report that the social partners have an advisory role within the governance structure of the PES. This is the case, for example, in Lithuania, where the social partners participate in the formal Tripartite and Employment Council of the national PES, providing strategic advice and consultation in relation to policy evaluation. In Ireland, even though the social partners do not participate in the management of the national PES (Intreo), they are consulted on its activities and role through the Labour Market Advisory Council (LMAC). Similarly, in Denmark, the social partners advise the labour ministry via the national Labour Market Council (Arbejdsmarkedsrådet), a body outside the national PES governance.

In another four Member States, the social partners are excluded from the formal governance structures of the PES. In Hungary, this has been the case since 2015 when the national PES was dissolved. In Italy, the PES operates as a decentralised network following the dissolution of the Italian National Agency for Active Labour Policies (ANPAL), which was suppressed in March 2024, with its functions transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. In Latvia, there is no governance body for the agency that acts as the PES and operates as a direct line department of the Ministry of Welfare; a similar setup is found in Cyprus, where the PES operates as part of the Department of Labour of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.

While there are several similarities between the social partners’ roles in the PES and SSI across Europe, there are differences too.

In six countries, the social partners are involved in the governance of the SSI as co-managers. In Austria, for instance, the umbrella organisation the Federation of Social Insurances (DVSV) and the individual health and pension funds are administered by the social partners. This is also the case for the Belgian National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (RIZIV) and National Employment Office (RVA-ONEM, responsible for unemployment benefits) and for the Estonian Health Insurance Fund.

In another six countries, the social partners have a supervisory role: for instance, in Bulgaria’s National Social Security Institute, where they participate in the supervisory board; in the management board of Slovenia’s Health Insurance Institute (ZZZS); and in Slovakia’s Social Insurance Agency.

In only four countries do the social partners have an advisory role in SSI governance, which is a significantly lower number than in the case of PES. In all cases, their participation is formal and usually based on legally mandated seats on boards or general councils alongside state representatives. This is the case in Cyprus for the Social Insurance Service (SIS); Italy for the National Social Security Institute (INSP) and National Institute for Insurance Against Workplace Accidents (INAIL); Portugal for the Institute for Social Security (ISS); and Romania for the National Pension Fund (CNPP) and National Health Insurance Fund (CNAS).

The social partners’ roles in the SSI governance structures of five Member States differ depending on institution, a situation that does not arise for PES. For example, the German health insurance provider GKV-Spitzenverband and the accident insurance provider the German Social Accident Insurance (DGUV) operate under the social partners’ statutory self-administration, while the pension insurance provider DRV Bund has a supervisory body in which the social partners participate. Unédic and the Agricultural Social Mutual Fund (MSA) in France are paritarian institutions fully managed by the social partners, while in the state-managed National Health Fund (CNAM) and National Family Allowance Fund (CNAF), they act as supervisors. In Finland, the social partners manage the Workers' Compensation Centre (TVK), have a supervisory role in the Employment Fund and act only as advisors for Kela, the social insurance institution.

In seven Member States, the social partners report no or minimal involvement in the SSI, a higher number than in the case of PES. Aside from Hungary and Latvia, in the which the social partners have no role in the governance of the PES either, the Czech Social Security Administration (CSSA) and Irish Department of Social Protection also have no room for social partner involvement, given that they are administered by the relevant ministry. In addition, the SSI of the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway have no social partner seats on their governance boards.

Having a formal role does not necessarily translate into having effective influence over the institutions’ governance. The case of Bulgaria, where the Employment Promotion Act legally establishes a consultative council to incorporate the social partners into PES governance, is illustrative. Here the national employer representatives report that the council has been non-functional due to not being convened for over five years. Similarly, in Luxembourg, the national PES (the Employment Development Agency, ADEM) should include a monitoring commission with the social partners as members. However, the trade unions report that the commission has been dormant for an extended period, which has suspended their oversight role. The same has happened with the employment committees of the PES in Cyprus. All these examples indicate that a legally embedded role for the social partners does not guarantee influence over decisions affecting the labour market.

Across the different degrees of involvement, the social partners bring significant added value to the governance of the PES and SSI, both in their own view and in that of the management of these institutions. In cases in which the social partners co-manage the institutions, both they and the management representatives assessed the role of the social partners as ensuring legitimacy, consensus and durability of mutually agreed decisions. For example, in Austria, the social partners pointed to their role as a clear example of ‘lived’ social partnership in agreement with the AMS management, as did the trade unions and management of the three Belgian PES.

Where the social partners have a supervisory role, the two sides see their added value in effective monitoring and oversight, despite the social partners’ frustration regarding the actual influence they have. This is specifically the case in Poland and Spain, among others, where the monitoring role was underlined by both the social partners and management.

For the countries where the social partners have an advisory role in the governance of PES, they usually advocate for a stronger role. An exception is Sweden, where both sides are satisfied with the role the social partners hold in both the PES and SSI and indicated that state agencies should be primarily run by the state, since the social partners have tools such as lobbying and collective bargaining. The management’s view is similar, regarding the social partners as a ‘vital sounding board’. A similar view was recorded in Norway, where the social partners are content with the high-level political bodies they use to influence the governance of bodies responsible for the welfare state, while management emphasised the role of mutual trust and informal relations with the social partners.

In the countries with no or minimal social partner involvement, the views expressed by the social partners were limited, but those available reflected frustration on the social partners’ side, especially in the case of Hungary. Management representatives pointed to a ‘latent value’ that the inclusion of the social partners might bring, but it is not used; the absence of the social partners in the governance of Ireland’s SSI is a case in point.

The comparative evidence gathered illustrates how social partner involvement in PES and SSI governance comes in many forms across Europe. Regardless of the diversity of approaches, the inclusion of the social partners is not a barrier to public institutions’ modernisation, but rather a source of legitimacy, transparency and policy feasibility.